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INTRODUCTION
On June 17th 2013, representatives for the European Union and
the United States gathered at the G8 Summit in Northern Ireland and
announced their commitment to the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (the “TTIP”) for the first time.1 That day
represented a special moment for relations between the European
1. See President Obama, European Commission President Barroso, and European
Council President Van Rompuy, Remarks on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (June 17, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/
remarks-president-obama-uk-prime-minister-cameron-european-commission-pr;
Presidents
Barroso and Obama Announce Launch of TTIP Negotiations, DELEGATION E.U. TO U.S. (Jan.
11, 2014), http://www.euintheus.org/press-media/ttip-launch-with-president-obama-at-g8-apowerful-demonstration-of-our-determination-to-shape-an-open-and-rules-based-world-sayspresident-barroso/ (discussing how politicians have stressed the importance of TTIP).
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Union and the United States.2 The TTIP, if ever realized, will
integrate two of the most developed, sophisticated, and certainly
largest economies in the world.3 Since its ideation, both parties
recognized that concluding the TTIP did not represent an easy task,
but they promised to find convincing answers to legitimate concerns
and solutions to thorny issues.4
The purpose of the TTIP is to reaffirm the strong partnership and
the shared values of democracy and individual freedom held by the
European Union and the United States in a common commitment to
create jobs and sustainable growth.5 These parties aim to build their
common wealth and a safer, more prosperous world for future
generations.6
If ratified, the TTIP would feature a chapter on investments and
an investor-state arbitration clause.7 Investments play a central role in
any modern economy and today, investments are commonly made
across borders.8 When companies invest they create new trade
benefits, jobs, and income.9 International investors need provisions
that ensure certain protections, such as assurances that they will be
treated in the same manner as domestic investors.10 Sometimes,
domestic courts are not appropriate to resolve trans-border investment
disputes, especially when the investor is victim to expropriation
without proper compensation, is the subject of discrimination, or is
deprived of due process.11 In such cases, the collection of protections
known as Investor-State Dispute Solutions (“ISDS”) is important as it
provides for a neutral forum for resolving these international

2. See supra note 1 (addressing the relevance of the episode).
3. See id. (stating the importance of the TTIP).
4. See id. (referring to the understaking of the parties).
5. Joint Statement EU-US Summit, E.U. EXTERNAL ACTION (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140326_02_en.pdf.
6. See id. (describing the final aim of the parties).
7. See European Commission, Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS) in European Union Agreements, EUROPA (Mar. 2014),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152273.pdf;
Mark
Weaver,
Comment, The Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): ISDS
Provisions, Reconciliation, and Future Trade Implications, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 225,
235-36 (2014) (specifying the contents of the TTIP).
8. See supra note 7 (articulating the relevance of foreign investments).
9. See id. (disclosing the advantages of investments).
10. See id. (revealing what investors need).
11. See id. (explaining why domestic courts are not apt for cross border investment
dispute).
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disputes.12 This means that the parties agree to give governments the
right to regulate in the public interest, to define terms like “indirect
expropriation” and “fair and equitable treatment,” and to prevent
abuse of the system and conflicts of interest in arbitrators by
establishing a code of conduct.13 Investment arbitration can be
formulated by bilateral treaties (international agreements between two
parties), multilateral treaties (an international agreement between
several parties), and foreign investment law enacted by states at the
national level.14
The ISDS represents a critical aspect within the TTIP.15
Opponents to the TTIP argue that bilateral investment treaties
(“BITs”) and ISDS give foreign investors “special rights” unavailable
to domestic firms.16 Since foreign nationals are empowered to
challenge a sovereign state, opponents affirm that they can easily
attack a government’s policy and deter governments from enacting
sound policies. For example, critics allege that states will fail to
benefit the environment or to improve the health or safety of their
populations, fearing that those policies might trigger an ISDS action
from a foreign investor.17
The ISDS system constitutes one of the most discussed topics in
the modern era.18 The number of suits filed against countries at the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)
12. See id. (stating one characteristic of the ISDS).
13. See id. (clarifying what an ISDS clause usually provides for).
14. See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE, & MATTHEW WEINIGER,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 26 (2008); International Investment Agreements
Navigator, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountryGrouping#
iiaInnerMenu (laying out where investment arbitration can usually be found).
15. See Michael Robinson, Is democracy threatened if companies can sue countries?,
BBC (Mar. 31 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32116587; Europeans Don’t Want
Investor State Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements, STOP TTIP, https://stopttip.org/europeans-dont-want-investor-state-dispute-settlement-trade-agreements/;
Marley
Weiss, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE (Mar. 12, 2015),
http://www.outsourcingjustice.com/investor-state-dispute-settlement/ (introducing critical
aspects of the ISDS clause in the TTIP).
16. See generally Scott Miller and Gregory N. Hicks, Investor-State Dispute Settlement:
A Reality Check, CSIS (Jan. 2015), http://csis.org/files/publication/150116_Miller_
InvestorStateDispute_Web.pdf; see also Investor-state dispute settlement: special rights for
investors, serious threat to our climate, TRANSNAT’L INST. (Nov. 12, 2015),
https://www.tni.org/en/event/investor-state-dispute-settlement-special-rights-for-investorsserious-threat-to-our-climate (discussing foreign investors rights in investor state arbitration).
17. See Stop TTIP, supra note 15; Weiss, supra note 15 (introducing critical aspects of
the ISDS clause in the TTIP and analyzing some criticism of the ISDS clause).
18. See supra note 7 (analyzing what the ISDS represents in the modern society).
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is now around 600, and it grows an average of one case per week.19
Concerns come especially from civil society. One of the latest
examples is that, after the twelfth round of TTIP negotiations, 280
civil society organizations from across Europe (with the support of
US and Canadian groups) issued a statement calling on the European
Commission and the United States Trade Representative to eliminate
the ISDS from the TTIP and all other trade agreements.20 The main
concerns relate not only to criticisms of the exclusive rights granted to
foreign investors and their ability to challenge the public policy of a
sovereign state, but also the lack of democratic principles, the
impossibility to change the rules after the treaty will be signed, and
the absence of local remedies.21 Finally, the statement questions
whether TTIP’s ISDS provisions provide any actual use, since parties
usually have legal systems perfectly capable of handling disputes with
foreign investors without referring to these mechanisms.22 Even if it is
important to consider the strong concerns over the ISDS in the TTIP
and in general, this Comment will focus primarily on legal aspects,
trying to speculate on possible future developments in the negotiation
of the TTIP.
This Comment first analyzes the structure of the possible ISDS
provision in the TTIP. Part I represents an overview of the TTIP, by
laying out what this free trade agreement entails and by discussing the
agreement’s investment chapter, which constitutes one of the twentyfour chapters contained in the proposal and included in the Rules. Part
II will consider the typical features and structure of International
Investment Agreements (“IIAs”), as well as United States and
European Union positions, outlining the differences and the
similarities between the United States’ and European Union’s
approach to IIAs. Part III will discuss the negotiation of TTIP and
some of the provisions that have been subject to public consultation in
Europe. This Comment concludes that the United States’ and
19. See 280 organizations from Europe, Canada and the US denounce the inclusion of
investors’ rights in TTIP, SEATTLE TO BRUSSELS NETWORK (Feb. 22, 2016),
http://www.s2bnetwork.org/isds-statement-feb2016/ [hereinafter 280 organizations]; Claire
Provost and Matt Kennard, The obscure legal system that lets corporations sue countries,
GUARDIAN (June 10, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legalsystem-lets-corportations-sue-states-ttip-icsid (stating some data related to ISDS system).
20. See 280 organizations, supra note 19 (introducing Statement against Investor
Protection in TTIP, CETA, and other trade deals).
21. See id. (listing some criticisms of ISDS analyzed by the statement).
22. See id. (wondering about the real utility of these systems).
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European Union’s positions are similar, and that conflicts between the
two approaches are even potentially reconcilable.
I. TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP:
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND INVESTMENT CHAPTER
This Part explores the current status of the TTIP, defines the
main aspects of this agreement and describes the rationale behind the
agreement’s investment chapter. Part I.A discusses the actual
negotiations on the TTIP as well as its main purpose and structure.
Part I.B briefly outlines what free trade agreements (“FTAs”) are, and
distinguishes them from other similar agreements— in particular from
BITs.
A. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
The TTIP is a proposed FTA currently under negotiation
between the United States and European Union.23 The TTIP deals
with three different areas: market access, regulatory components, and
rules.24 Concerning the area of market access, the TTIP’s goal is to
increase market access through the elimination of barriers to trade and
investment in goods, services, and agriculture, as well as the further
opening of government procurement markets. Currently, the average
tariffs between the United States and the European Union are already
relatively low, at an average rate of about 3.5% ad valorem for the
United States and about 5.5% for the European Union.25 However,
there are higher tariffs on certain import-sensitive product categories
such as dairy, sugar and confectionery, beverages and tobacco, fish
and fish merchandises, and textiles and apparel.26 Given the

23. See generally Shayerah Ilias Akhtar & Vivian C. Jones, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R43158, PROPOSED TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT
PARTNERSHIP (TTIP): IN BRIEF (2013); European Commission, The Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP): TTIP explained, EUROPA (Mar. 19, 2015)
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152462.pdf [hereinafter European
Commission].
24. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 1; European Commission, supra note 23, at 1
(analyzing the main parts of the TTIP).
25. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 6; European Commission, supra note 23, at 1
(outlining how US-European Union market works and how tariffs currently stand).
26. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 6; The Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) TTIP explained, supra note 23, at 1 (discussing which products feature
higher tariffs between United States and European Union).
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magnitude of the transatlantic relationship, further elimination and
reduction of tariffs could yield significant economic gains.27
In relation to the regulatory issues, the TTIP aims to enhance
regulatory coherence and cooperation between the United States and
European Union.28 The crux of the TTIP, as regarded by many
commentators, hinges on regulatory issues.29 Fundamental sectors of
interest include automobiles, chemicals, cosmetics, information
communication technologies, medical devices, pesticides, and
pharmaceuticals.30 However, there is disagreement on whether a
comprehensive agreement on regulatory issues will actually be
reached, as stark differences between the United States and European
Union still exist.31 First, the United States and European Union have
been discussing various regulatory disparities, and although many
have been resolved, a number of issues still remain.32 Second, some
of the regulatory differences depend on divergent public preferences
and values.33 For example, European consumers usually prefer
“naturally produced” foods, while American consumers are inclined
to accept products developed by alternative forms of agricultural
production, such as genetically modified organisms (“GMOs”).34
Third, while the European Union has a preventative decision-taking
approach in the case of risk management (known as the
“precautionary principle”), some United States enterprises think that
this approach can adversely impact businesses since it may lead to
27. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 6; The Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) TTIP explained, supra note 23, at 1 (addressing that a change of the tariffs
could have a strong economic impact).
28. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 7; European Commission, supra note 23, at 1
(affirming what the regulatory chapter will realize).
29. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 7; see generally Irving A. Williamson et. al.,
Trade Barriers that U.S. Small And Medium-sized Enterprises Perceive as Affecting Exports to
the European Union, USITC (March 2014), http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/
pub4455.pdf (elucidating that the regulatory chapter is often considered the most important
part of the TTIP).
30. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 7; see generally supra note 29. (listing the
main areas of the regulatory chapter).
31. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 7; See generally supra note 29. (noting that
there will be difficulties in finalizing the agreement).
32. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 7; See generally supra note 29 (addressing
problems related to the regulatory chapter).
33. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 7; See generally supra note 29(stating that
some of the differences between United States and European Union relate to preferences and
values).
34. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23 at 7; See generally supra note 29 (illustrating an
example of different preferences between United States and European Union consumers).
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stringent regulatory limitations.35 The European Union is discussing
these regulatory standards with the United States on the strict
condition that no concession is made regarding the levels of
protection currently in Europe, such as health shields, environmental
safeguards, and consumer protections.36 Regulatory calibration and
mutual recognition will only be possible if confluence on the safety
and environmental standards is assured.37
Finally, the TTIP will develop new rules in areas such as foreign
direct investment, intellectual property rights, labor, the environment,
and emerging areas of trade.38 Many trade rules are already regulated
by the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), of which both the United
States and European Union are members, which means that both
parties will probably refer to them.39 Other trade-related rules, while
not addressed in the WTO, have become a standard part of United
States and European Union FTAs with other countries.40 The
negotiations could also break new ground on other issues that are not
heavily featured (or even present) in prior FTAs and multilateral
agreements, such as rules concerning state-owned enterprises.41
An agreement on market access, regulations and rules is
fundamental because it represents an opportunity to boost
transatlantic economic growth.42 Both limitations on market access
and differences on rules and regulation often cost time and money.43
35. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23 at 7; See generally supra note 29 (clarifying that
while European Union prefers a precautionary approach, United States disagrees, considering
the impact on small-business activities). Concerning the precautionary principle look at article
191 TFEU.
36. European Commission, supra note 23, at 2 (describing the conditions imposed by
European Union for the negotiation of regulatory measures).
37. See id. (noting which guarantee will probably be necessary for reaching the
agreement).
38. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 8; see generally Clara Weinhardt & Fabian
Bohnenberger, TTIP vs. WTO: Who sets global standards?, EURACTIV (Jan. 13, 2016),
http://www.euractiv.com/section/sustainable-dev/opinion/ttip-vs-wto-who-sets-globalstandards/ (demonstrating the scope of the TTIP).
39. See supra note 38 (commenting that TTIP rules may be similar to some already
established practices).
40. See id. (asserting that some rules, not contained in the WTO are considered
standards).
41. See id.. (arguing that the TTIP could potentially create new standards).
42. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 1; European Commission, supra note 23, at 1
(stressing that the TTIP can represent).
43. See What’s TTIP?, U. DENV. http://www.du.edu/korbel/ceuce/publications/
blog/2014/lambert-what-is-ttip.html (last visited May 19, 2016); Klint Alexander, The
Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and its Implications for U.S.
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This is why if the TTIP is finalized, the United States and European
Union could make real savings for their businesses, create jobs, and
bring better value for consumers.44
B. Free Trade Agreements
The TTIP is being negotiated as a FTA and it must be
distinguished from BITs.45 A BIT is a treaty between only two states
that governs the codification of rules and handling of investment
disputes between a member state (a country party to such an
international agreement) and the individuals and companies of the
other member state.46 An FTA is a trade arrangement between two or
more countries and serves to provide all parties to the deal
preferential treatment in trade by removing tariffs and nontariff
barriers between members of the agreement.47 Consequently, while
FTAs may often be similar in effect to BITs, the basic objectives of
FTAs and BITs differ.48 BITs seek to promote investment between a
pair of countries by providing investors with confidence in foreign
regulatory environments.49 FTAs are mechanisms for trade
liberalization that aim to eliminate discrimination against imports by
removing tariffs and other restrictions on the trade of goods.50
In the past, BITs and FTAs were two separate and parallel legal
instruments that had to address issues in different fields.51 Nowadays,
there are more and more FTAs being concluded and it is quite
common for FTAs to have an investment chapter.52 Trade and
Business,
CORP.
COMPLIANCE
INSIGHTS
(Dec.
11,
2013),
http://corporatecomplianceinsights.com/the-proposed-transatlantic-trade-and-investmentpartnership-ttip-and-its-implications-for-us-business/ (addressing problems of barriers in
trade).
44. See supra note 43 (stating what the TTIP can bring in the world economy).
45. See Russell Thirgood, Bilateral Investment Treaties, GLOBAL LEGAL POST (Jan. 7,
2014),
http://www.globallegalpost.com/global-view/bilateral-investment-treaties-providingunlimited-opportunities-58721287/; Weaver, supra note 7, at 228. (stating that BITs are
different from FTAs).
46. See supra note 45 (defining what a BIT is).
47. See id. (specifying what a FTA is).
48. See id. (noting that even if similar the BITs and the FTAs have different objectives).
49. See id. (discussing the scope of the BITs).
50. See id. (describing the general scope of FTAs).
51. See LEON E. TRAKMAN & NICOLA W. RANIERI, REGIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 22 (2013); Chang-fa Lo, A Comparison of Bit and the Investment Chapter
of Free Trade Agreement, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 147, 168(2008)
(discussing how BITs and FTAs were considered in the past).
52. See supra note 51 (considering that the content of FTA has changed).
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investment are more integrated, encompassing various emerging
elements of international commerce: exports, imports used in exports,
use of foreign affiliates for sale, globalized production and
distribution in foreign direct investments.53
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION
AND THE INVESTOR STATE DISPUTE SOLUTION CLAUSE IN
THE TTIP
This Part discusses how investor-state arbitration works and how
the European Union and United States approach the negotiation of the
TTIP. Part II.A explains how BITs are structured, discusses their
main provisions, and compares them to the typical standards of
investor-state arbitration. Part II.B describes the European Union and
United States’s background on the TTIP and the actual approach to
the investor-state clause in the agreement in question.
A. Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Main Provisions of
International Investment Agreements
The first BIT was signed in 1959 between Germany and
Pakistan.54 Many followed suit and exponentially increased to reach a
global total of 2,928 BITs in 2015.55 A BIT is typically structured to
include the following sections: a preamble, definitions, admission,
substantive rights (fair and equitable treatment, most favored nation,
national treatment, umbrella clause and full protection and security,
protection from expropriation), compensation for losses, free transfer
of payments, settlement of disputes, subrogation, state to state dispute
and duration.56 This Part will explore the main provisions of a BIT
and investor-state arbitration generally, as well as some procedural
aspects.

53. See id. (stating that trade and investments are two connected subject).
54. See Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Pak.-Ger., Nov. 25,
1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 24.
55. See UNCTAD, supra note 14.
56. See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 52; Jarrod Wong, Umbrella
Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the
Divide between Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes , 14
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 135, 141 (explaining how a BIT is constructed).
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1. Provisions Regarding the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
A tribunal has jurisdiction under a BIT only if three elements are
met: the notions of investor, investment, and the duration of the
treaty.57 A crucial component of how BITs define investors involves
nationality, and when a person or corporation can be defined as a
national of a foreign state. Likewise, questions regarding investment
involve how broad that definition is. Finally, issues concerning the
duration of a BIT look to what happens when the treaty expires.
Concerning the concept of nationality, before the development
of international investment treaties nationality was relevant to
determine whether a state could bring a claim of an injured alien
under diplomatic protection.58 In particular, customary international
law allowed a State to confer nationality upon a person only if there
was a “genuine link” between that person and the state of
nationality.59 The relevance of the state nationality, at the time of the
diplomatic protection, was highlighted in a famous case, Belgium v.
Spain, where Belgium claimed that Spain should be held accountable
for an injury to a Canadian corporation operating in Spain. It was
found that only the State from where the company came from can
exercise this right to seek payment.60 No such law had been
established for shareholders.61 If a wrong was done to a company that
resulted in harm to its shareholders, then only the State (representing
the company) had the authority to seek compensation.62 The court
found that Belgium did not have the right to bring Spain to court since
the company was located in Canada.63
Now under investor-state arbitration, in nearly every case, only
nationals of a contracting State other than the host State in which the

57. See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 29; Alexandre de Gramont &
Maria Gritsenko, Key Issues and Recent Developments in International Investment Treaty
Arbitration, CROWELL & MORING LLP 6 (2007), https://www.crowell.com/documents/KeyIssues-and-Recent-Developments-in-International-Investment-Treaty-Arbitration.pdf.
58. See supra note 57 (stating which was the function of the nationality definition when
there were no international investment agreements).
59. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgement, 1955 I.C.J Rep. 23.
60. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co, Limited (Belg. v.
Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 38, ¶ 53 (specifying how diplomatic protection worked).
61. See id. (noting that shareholders do not have the right to bring a claim).
62. See id. (explaining that the state entitled to bring a claim was the state in which the
company has nationality).
63. See id. (determining which country could bring the claim).
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investment is made can be protected by a treaty’s provisions.64
Usually natural persons are considered nationals of a state when they
are citizens.65 However, it is more complex to identify the nationality
of a corporation.66 Usually BITs use one or a combination of the three
following tests: incorporation, which refers to the nationality of the
company via the State under the laws of which it is organized;
control, where an investor that has the nationality of one BIT party is
entitled to protection only of investment in the territory of the other
BIT party that it owns or controls; and/or management of the
company, which ascribes nationality to the State where the company
investor has its place of business.67
One of the main cases concerning the nationality tests for a
corporation is Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, where the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Tribunal discussed
whether jurisdiction existed to hear claims brought by Tokios
Tokelės.68 The Tribunal, interpreting Article 25 of the ICSID
Convention, established that the nationality of a corporation must be
decided in accordance with the place of incorporation in the absence
of an express “control provision.”69 Consequently, although ninetynine percent of Tokios was owned by a Ukrainian national, the
Tribunal determined that it was a Lithuanian corporation.70 In his
dissenting opinion, Professor Weil proposed a more flexible
approach.71 He suggested that it was necessary to look at the origin of
capital, not a company’s formal incorporation. To avoid that, in
contrast with the purpose of the ICSID system, the ICSID mechanism
64. See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14; Alexandre de Gramont & Maria
Gritsenko, supra note 57 (2007) (clarifying that the investment agreement protects foreign
nationals and the nationality represents the subject matter jurisdiction).
65. See Nottebohm Case, supra note 59, at 23.
66. McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 52; ANDRÉS RIGO SUREDA,
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 43 (2012) (affirming
that it is easier to identify the nationality of a natural person than the nationality of a
corporation).
67. See See SUREDA, supra note 66 (listing the different tests which can be used to
identify the nationality of a corporation).
68. See Tokeles v. Ukraine, ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 23 (Apr. 29 2004)
(introducing the case regarding Tokios Tokeles, a Lithuanian corporation, with no substantial
business activities in Lithuania, 99 percent of its shares in the corporate entity owned by
Ukrainian nationals, managerial control of the company vested in Ukrainian nationals, and
capital originating in Ukraine).
69. Id. (discussing the application of the incorporation test).
70. See id. (explaining the finding of the Tribunal).
71. See id. (introducing the dissenting opinion).
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would be applied to national investments (“veil piercing doctrine”).72
The case is relevant because the Tribunal established that the doctrine
of “veil piercing” should not override the terms of the BIT, resulting
in the Tribunal’s declining jurisdiction.73 Finally, it is important to
point out that the ICSID Tribunals established that the corporation
must possess home-state nationality continuously from the date of
injury to the date of official commencement of the arbitration
request.74
Considering the concept of investment, almost all BITs adopt a
similar formula for satisfying the definition of investment, which
usually includes a widely inclusive phrase as well as a list of specific
categories such as property, shares contracts, and intellectual property
rights.75 One of the most well-known definitions of “investment” is
provided by the ICSID Tribunal in Salini Costruttori S.P.A. and
Italstrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, where two Italian
companies claimed damages against Morocco.76 The Tribunal
determined that investments are comprised of four elements:
contributions to the economic development of the host State,
monetary contribution, certain duration of performance for a contract,
and a participation in the risks of the transaction.77
Notwithstanding, the notion of investment is broad. Tribunals
usually consider pre-contract costs as separate to the investment
unless a State consents otherwise.78 Tribunals also usually recognize
indirect investment and consequently they generally consider the
claims brought by shareholders, whether they are controlling
shareholders or not, as valid ultimate beneficiaries.79
72. See id. (explaining the control test).
73. See id. (explaining the relevance of the case).
74. See The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. U.S., ARB(AF)/98/3,
Award, ¶ 225 (June 26, 2003) (discussing a case where the chairman of a Canadian
corporation involved in the death-care industry filed claims seeking damages for alleged
injuries arising out of litigation in which the company was involved in Mississippi state
courts).
75. See Energy Charter Treaty, art. 1(6), Dec. 17, 1994, 34 ILM 360, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95,
(addressing the notion of investment).
76. See Salini Costruttori S.P.A. and Italstrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco,
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, [insert pincite] (July 23, 2001) (describing the foremost
definition of investment).
77. See id. (describing the foremost definition of investment).
78. See Milhaly Int’l Corp. v. Sri Lanka, ARB/00/2, Award, ¶ 61 (Mar. 15, 2002)
(explaining that pre-investment is generally not considered part of the investment).
79. See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 184-91; Inna Uchkunova,
Indirect Investments Through Chain of Intermediary Companies: A Philosopher’s Stone or
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Finally, the tribunal can have jurisdiction only if the BIT
temporally covers the investment.80 However, an investment can
possibly be protected even if a BIT came into force after the
investment was made, as many treaties include a retroactive provision
that expressly establishes this.81 In addition, an investment can also be
covered under a treaty when the treaty ceases to exist.82 BITs
generally provide for a fixed duration of at least ten years.83 However,
the treaties usually continue in force until a State provides specific
notice of its intent to withdraw.84 Moreover, after termination, there is
usually a period during which investments originally covered by the
BIT continue to retain protections provided under the treaty.85
2. Provisions Regarding Substantive Rights of the Investor
BITs always provide foreign investors with standard benefits,
which, despite some exceptions, are considered common features of
all investment treaties.86 In particular, some of most important
substantive rights include: the fair and equitable standard, protections
in case of expropriation, full protection and security, national
treatment, and the most favored nation treatment.

Not Any More?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Jul. 3, 2013), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/
blog/2013/07/03/indirect-investments-through-chain-of-intermediary-companies-aphilosophers-stone-or-not-any-more/ (stating that the notion of investment regularly includes
indirect investments).
80. See generally Johan Billiet, International Investment Arbitration: A Practical
Handbook (2016); Alexandre de Gramont & Maria Gritsenko, supra note 57.
81. See Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Alb., ARB/94/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 192 (Dec. 24,
1996) (noting that investments may be protected retrospectively).
82. See Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. U.S., ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 68 (Oct. 11, 2002)
(observing that investments are covered post-cessation).
83. See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 128; UNCTAD, bilateral
investment treaties 1995–2006: Trends in investment rulemaking, http://unctad.org/en/
docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf (clarifying the duration of a BIT).
84. See supra note 83.
85. See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 92; Patricio Grané, Umbrella
Clause Decisions: The Class of 2012 and a Remapping of the Jurisprudence, KLUWER ARB.
BLOG (Jan. 17, 2013), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2013/01/17/umbrella-clause-decisionsthe-class-of-2012-and-a-remapping-of-the-jurisprudence/(discussing the protection after the
termination of the BIT).
86. See The Basics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, SIDLEY, http://www.sidley.com/
experience/the-basics-of-bilateral-investment-treaties; MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 240 (2d ed., 2012)
(introducing the standard rights of BITs).
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The fair and equitable treatment standard is recognized as part of
customary international law.87 This standard is a non-contingent right,
usually formulated with vague and imprecise language.88 This
contributes in large part to the controversy surrounding this standard,
mainly because many of its imprecise formulations provide for
different interpretations of its content.89 Generally, this standard
relates to the treatment of investors by the host State’s courts and to
the administrative decision-making of the host State.90
Considering the role of a host State’s courts, the ICSID Tribunal
in Azinian v. Mexico opined that a failure to entertain a suit, undue
delay, inadequate administration of justice, or a clear and malicious
misapplication of the law can cause a breach of the fair and equitable
treatment standard and, in particular, a denial of justice.91 An example
of how a national court may be sanctioned for breach of fair and
equitable treatment is represented by Loewen, a famous case
pertaining to the American legal system.92 In Loewen, the Canadian
claimant alleged that the jury ruling which awarded its American
competitor US$500 million in damages was unfair and
discriminatory.93 The Tribunal found that the judicial process
“amounted to an international wrong” because local procedural rules
required Loewen to post a bond of 125 percent of the amount of the
judgment in order to secure a stay of execution pending appeal.94
87. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 284 (May 12, 2005)
(affirming that the fair and equitable standard under domestic law is not different from the one
under international law). According to the Tribunal, the “treaty standard of fair and equitable
treatment and its connection with the required stability and predictability of the business
environment founded on solemn legal and contractual commitments, is not different from the
international law minimum standard and its evolution under customary law.” Id.
88. See generally Mahnaz Malik, Bulletin #3: Fair and Equitable Treatment, IISD
(Sept. 2009), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/best_practices_bulletin_3.pdf; Stephan W. Schill,
Book Review, 20 EUROPEAN J. OF INT’L L. 236, 236 (2009) (reviewing Ioana Tudor’s The
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign Investment
andintroducing the fair and equitable treatment standard).
89. See Malik, supra note 88, at 9; Schill, supra note 88, at 236 (addressing a problem
regarding the fair and equitable treatment standard).
90. See Malik, supra note 88, at 9; McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 226
(introducing the context in which a fair and equitable treatment issue can arise).
91. See Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian, & Ellen Baca v. Mex., ARB (AF)/97/2,
Award, ¶ 102-03 (Nov. 1, 1999).
92. See Malik, supra note 88, at 10; McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at
227 (introducing two cases in which domestic courts have been sanctioned for violation of the
fair and equitable treatment standard).
93. See supra note 74.
94. Id.
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Another category of cases involving the standard of fair and
equitable treatment consider the review of administrative conduct.95
Tribunals usually refer to two factors that determine whether an
investor has been treated fairly by an administrative decision:
legitimate expectations and due process.96 Legitimate expectations
concern the treatment afforded to an investor by reference to the law
of the host State at the time of the investment.97 Meanwhile, due
process depends on whether administrative decisions have been
reached through a fair process, or if the host State acted according to
improper purposes within its administrative powers.98 In terms of
legitimate expectations, the ICSID Tribunal in Tecmed v. Mexico
defined the scope of the fair and equitable treatment standard based
on an autonomous interpretation under the Spain-Mexico BIT.99 It
stated that the fair and equitable treatment provision requires the
Contracting Parties to provide international investments treatment that
does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by
the foreign investor to make the investment.100 According to the
Tribunal, the foreign investor expects the host State to act in a
consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparent in its
relations with the foreign investor.101
The second factor that determines the treatment of the investor is
due process in administrative decision-making.102 Proper due process
bars arbitrary and discriminatory decisions against non-nationals,
requires transparent proceedings, prohibits use of improper purposes,
forbids inconsistency of conduct vis-a-vis the investor, and also
forbids coercion or harassment by State authorities and bad faith.103

95. See Malik, supra note 88; Schill, supra note 88.
96. See Malik, supra note 88, at 11; McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at
233-34 (clarifying the two ways in which the administrative conduct can violate the fair and
equitable treatment).
97. See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 234 (explaining what the
legitimate expectation is).
98. See id. (identifying the concept of due process).
99. See Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mex., ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶
155 (May 29, 2003).
100. See id. ¶ 99 (defining when the concept of legitimate expectations is violated).
101. See id.
102. See Malik, supra note 88, at 13-15; McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14,
at 239 (introducing the importance of due process).
103. See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 239-43; Malik, supra note 88,
at 14-15 (defining the concept of due process).
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A second standard of protection in favor of the investor involves
full protection and security,104 which concerns a State’s failures to
protect an investor’s property from actual damage caused by either
corrupt State officials or by the actions of others where the State has
failed to exercise due diligence.105 It is thus principally concerned
with the exercise of police power.106
According to the ICSID Tribunal a State has an obligation to
take reasonable steps to protect its investors against harassment by
third parties and/or State actors.107 However, the ICSID Tribunal has
rejected the argument that the full protection and security standard
creates absolute liability.108 One of the most contested issues with
respect to the standard of full protection and security is whether or not
it extends beyond situations where the physical security of the
investor is compromised, including damages to intangible assets.109
The concept of national treatment is considered in the North
American Free Trade Agreement (‟NAFTA”) article 1102.110 It
ensures that each party shall accord to the investments of foreign
investors treatment no less favorable than that it accords to
investments of its own investors.111 In particular, the ICSID Tribunal
has held that the treatment accorded a foreign-owned investment
should be compared with that accorded a domestic investment in the
same business or economic sector.112

104. See 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, USTR art. 5(2) [hereinafter U.S.
Model BIT].
105. See id., at art. 5(2)(b) (defining the concept of the full protection and security
standard).
106. See id. (addressing the link between the full protection and security standard and the
police power).
107. See generally AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v.
Hung., ARB/07/22, Award, (Sept. 23, 2010).
108. See Asian Agric. Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Sri Lanka, ARB/87/3, Final Award, ¶ 48
(June 27, 1990).
109. See Jeffery Commission, The Full Protection and Security Standard in Practice,
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Apr. 16, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2009/04/16/the-fullprotection-and-security-standard-in-practice/; Mahnaz Malik, The Full Protection and Security
Standard Comes of Age: Yet Another Challenge for States in Investment Treaty Arbitration?,
IISD. ( Nov. 2011) 6-7, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/full_protection.pdf (addressing the
problem of physical security).
110. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1102(2), Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
111. See id.
112. See Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Can., Interim Award, ¶ 64-105 (June 26, 2000),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0674.pdf.

1372 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1355
The most favored nation treatment is also recognized as an
international customary law clause.113 The International Law
Commission (‟ILC”) has defined the most favored nation treatment as
“treatment accorded by the granting State to the beneficiary State, or
to persons or things in a determined relationship with that State,”
which must not be “less favorable than treatment extended by the
granting State to a third State or to persons or things in the same
relationship with that third State.”114
In relation to expropriation, when a State seized an investor’s
assets without compensation as part of a program of economic reform
in the past, the classic reaction was that the investor, in search of
compensation, could only seek diplomatic protection.115
Consequently, States would only select to honor claims motivated by
political concerns.116 This claim has expanded with the proliferation
of investment treaties.117 An expropriation is a governmental taking of
property, for which compensation is usually required.118 In addition to
tangible property, intangible property rights, such as shareholder and
contractual rights, can also be expropriated.119 Thus, in SPP v. Egypt,
the Tribunal rejected the argument that the term “expropriation”
applies only to property rights.120 The primary concern here is that the

113. See Draft Articles on Most-Favored-Nation Clauses with Commentaries, [1978] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 15, art. 5.
114. Id.
115. See Christoph Schreuer, Investment Protection and International Relations, in THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 345, 345 (A. Reinisch & U. Kriebaum eds., 2007),
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/87_investment_protect.pdf; TODD WEILER,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID,
NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (2005)
(addressing the problem of the diplomatic protection for investments).
116. See id. (explaining the investor’s protection in the past).
117. See Schreuer supra note 116, at 345-46; Weiler, supra note 116 (noting that
expropriation claims increased along the growth of the international investment agreements).
118. See Bassant El Attar et. al., Expropriation Clauses in International Investment
Agreements and the Appropriate Room for Host States to Enact Regulations: A Practical
Guide for States and Investors, GRADUATE INSTITUTE 5-9 (June 2009),
http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/ctei/shared/CTEI/Research%20Projec
ts/Trade%20Law%20Clinic/Expropriation%20clauses%20in%20International%20Investment
%20Agreements%20and%20the%20appropriate%20room%20for%20host%20States%20to%2
0enact%20regulations,%202009.pdf; McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 266;
Uchkunova, supra note 79 (defining the concept of expropriation).
119. See Southern Pac. Prop. (Middle East) Limited v. Egypt, ARB/84/3, Award, ¶ 164
(May 20,1992) (explaining which rights can be subject to expropriation).
120. See id. (quoting the Tribunal in SPP v. Egypt).
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definitions of expropriation included in investment treaties is so
general that they are not of any practical use for parties or tribunals.121
The model Canada BIT contains a typical provision that
prohibits expropriation without just compensation.122 Article 13.1 of
the model Canada BIT expresses that a State cannot expropriate an
investment “except for a public purpose, in accordance with due
process of law, in a non-discriminatory manner and on prompt,
adequate and effective compensation.”123
The intent to expropriate is not usually considered a requirement
in order to identify an expropriation (the “sole effective doctrine”).124
A common problem involves distinguishing between lawful and
unlawful expropriation.125 Some authorities believe illegal takings
require higher compensation, including damages.126 Moreover, it is
important to distinguish nationalization and expropriation. Usually,
nationalizations involve large-scale takings, while expropriation
refers to single state acts.127
Expropriation is usually distinguished as being either direct or
indirect. Direct expropriation refers to a mandatory legal transfer of
the title of property or its outright physical seizure operated by a
formal law or decree or physical act.128 On the other hand, indirect
expropriations do not have a clear or unequivocal definition; they
materialize through actions or conduct, which do not explicitly
express the purpose of depriving one of rights or assets but actually
121. It has been said of NAFTA, art. 1110 (1) that its “language is of such generality as
to be difficult to apply in specific cases.” Marvin Feldman v. Mex., ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶
98 (Dec. 16, 2002).
122. See Canada Model Bilateral International Treaty art. 13, ¶ 1.
123. Id.
124. See Weiler, supra note 116, at 615; McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14,
at 270 (clarifying that the intent to expropriate is not necessary to identify an expropriation).
125. See Weiler, supra note 116, at 631; Cameron McKenna, Tribunal weighs on
unlawful expropriation, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=1d18d9b9-778a-4041-ab4b-5ec6c4db6871 (noting the difference between
lawful and unlawful expropriation).
126. See supra note 110 (addressing the difference between lawful and unlawful
expropriation).
127. See Weiler, supra note 116, at 607-08; McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note
14, at 296 (describing the difference between expropriation and nationalization).
128. Expropriation, UNCTAD (2003), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_
en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD Expropriation]; “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to
Regulate” in International Investment Law”, (OECD, Working Paper No. 2004/04, 2004),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/780155872321; Suzy H. Nikièma, Best Practices: Indirect
Expropriation, IISD (Mar. 2012). http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/best_practice_indirect_
expropriation.pdf (defining direct expropriation).
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have that effect.129 ICSID Tribunals have held that there is no
expropriation when there is only an omission of state action; rather,
an intentional act must occur.130 Moreover, there is no expropriation
when the investor consents to the expropriatory measure, as
expropriation must be a compulsory transfer.131
There are different forms of indirect expropriation, such as
creeping expropriation and measures tantamount to expropriation.132
Creeping expropriation is not the result of a single state action, but
results from a number of actions that gradually result in
expropriation.133 A measure tantamount to expropriation is a state
action that is not superficially intended to expropriate, but is still
considered a type of expropriation.134 According to the arbitral
decision in S.D. Meyers v. Canada, “[t]he primary meaning of the
word ‘tantamount’ given by the Oxford English Dictionary is
‘equivalent,’ both words require a tribunal to look at the substance of
what has occurred and not only the form.”135
States often conclude contracts with investors. However, not
every breach of such contracts constitutes an expropriation.136 The
most important criterion for distinguishing between a simple breach
of contract and the expropriation of contract rights is whether the
State acts in its commercial role as a party to the contract or in its
sovereign capacity.137 Not all government measures entitle the
investor to compensation. Often, if the deprivation of ownership is not
129. See Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mex., ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶
114 (May 29, 2003).
130. See Eudoro Armando Olguin v. Para., ARB/98/5, Award, ¶ [insert para. #] (July
26, 2001).
131. See Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Alb., ARB/94/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 135 (Dec.
24, 1996).
132. See Peter D. Isakoff, Defining the Scope of Indirect Expropriation for
International Investments, 3 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 189, 195 (2013); Christoph Schreuer, The
Concept of Expropriation under the ETC and other Investment Protection Treaties 5-6 (May
20, 2005), http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf (listing the different forms
of indirect expropriation).
133. See Isakoff, supra note 132, at 195-96; Schreuer supra note 132, at 4-5 (defining
creeping expropriation).
134. See Isakoff supra note 132, at 193-94; Schreuer supra note 132, at 5-6 (giving the
definition of measure as tantamount to expropriation).
135. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Can., Partial Award, ¶ 285 (Nov. 13, 2000).
136. See Schreuer, supra note 132, at 1; UNCTAD Expropriation, supra note 128, at 26
(outlining the difference between a breach of a contract and an expropriation).
137. See id. (explaining how to identify when a breach of contract implies an
expropriation).
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radical, fundamental, in significant part, substantial, or serious, no
compensation can be claimed because the act represents merely a
regulatory measure.138 Nowadays, most investment treaties contain a
provision in which the host State agrees to comply with any
obligation undertaken with respect to investments of the other State;
the effect of which is to elevate contract breaches to actual treaty
violations.139 It is vital to distinguish between contract claims and
treaty claims.140 Contract claims arise when there is a breach of
contract, whereas treaty claims deal with violations of a treaty.141 Not
only will the jurisdiction differ for each claim, but the applicable law
will also vary.142 In contract claims, the tribunal will apply the
applicable law for the contract, which is usually chosen by the parties;
in treaty claims, the tribunal will apply relevant international law.143
Moreover, a tribunal may be jurisdictionally limited in determining
claims of treaty breach, or may have jurisdiction over the contractual
rights if the parties agree to it.144 This distinction is not present if a
treaty contains a so-called “umbrella clause.”145 For instance, Article
II.2(c) of the United States-Argentina BIT provides that “[e]ach party
shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to

138. See Weiler, supra note 116, at 621; Andrew Paul Newcombe, Regulatory
Expropriation, Investment Protectionand International Law: When Is Government Regulation
Expropriatory and When Should Compensation Be Paid? 73 (1999) (Master of Laws thesis,
University of Toronto), http://www.italaw.com/documents/RegulatoryExpropriation.pdf .
139. See Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pak., ARB/01/13, Objection to
Jurisdiction, ¶ 163 (Aug. 6, 2003); McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 92;
Granè, supra note 85(defining the umbrella clause).
140. See McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 127; see generally
Emmanuel Gaillard, Treaty-Based Jurisdiction: Broad Dispute, Resolution Clauses, 234 N.Y.
L. J. 1 (2005), http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2005/10/
TreatyBased-Jurisdiction-Broad-Dispute-Resolutio__/Files/Download-PDF-TreatyBasedJurisdiction-Broad-Disp__/FileAttachment/IA_100605.pdf (specifying that there is a
difference between contract claims and treaty claims).
141. See JAN OLE VOSS, THE IMPACT OF INVESTMENT TREATIES ON CONTRACTS
BETWEEN HOST STATES AND FOREIGN INVESTORS 166 (2011); Schreuer, supra note 132
(discussing the difference between contract claims and treaty claims).
142. See Voss, supra note 141, at 165-67; Schreuer supra note 132 (articulating the
consequences of the difference between contract claims and treaty claims).
143. See id. (discussing applicable law).
144. See id. (referring to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal).
145. See McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 92; Grané, supra note 85,
(specifying the function of the umbrella clause).
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investments.”146 However, there is no consistency in how these cases
have been decided.147
In SGS v. Pakistan, the Tribunal rejected the notion that a
contract claim could be transformed into a treaty claim by virtue of an
umbrella clause.148 A few months later, the same Tribunal interpreted
another umbrella clause differently in SGS v. Philippines, stating that
“each Contracting Party shall observe any legal obligation it has
assumed, or will in the future assume, with regard to specific
investments covered by the BIT.”149 Arbitral tribunals generally
interpret these clauses differently, so it is likely that umbrella clauses
will remain one of the most controversial areas of international
investment law.150
3. Parallel Proceedings
If an investment treaty does not expressly provide for it, there is
no requirement to exhaust local remedies as condition precedent to
the invocation of a tribunal’s jurisdiction.151 Moreover, the pursuit of
local remedies will not preclude the investor from subsequent
invocation of a treaty claim unless prohibited by an express treaty
provision.152 This could require an election in remedies or a treaty
provision requiring the waiver of all claims as a condition of valid
invocation of treaty arbitration.153 Sometimes agreements contain a
146. Treaty between U.S. and Arg. Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and
Protection of Investment, U.S-Arg., art. 2(c), Nov, 14, 1991, http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/43475.pdf.
147. See Gramont & Gritsenko, supra note 57, at 51; McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger,
supra note 14, at 111 (addressing a problem related to the umbrella clause).
148. See Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pak., ARB/01/13, Objection to
Jurisdiction, ¶ 167 (Aug. 6, 2003).
149. Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Phil., ARB/02/6, Objection to
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 115, 119 (Jan. 29, 2004).
150. See Granè, supra note 85; Gramont & Gritsenko, supra note 57, at 53 (noting that
the umbrella clause represents an issue in investment arbitration).
151. See Memorandum from Bahakal Yimer, Nicolas Cisneros, Laura Bisiani & Rahul
Donde, Graduate Inst. Int’l Dev. 9 (June 10, 2011), http://graduateinstitute.ch
/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/ctei/shared/CTEI/Law%20Clinic/Memoranda%202011/UNCT
AD_Memo.pdf; McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 128 (specifying that the
exhaustion of local remedies is usually not required).
152. See LUIZ EDUARDO SALLES & AZEVEDO SETTE, FORUM SHOPPING IN
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: THE ROLE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS 245 (2016);
McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 129; Memorandum from Yimer, et. al.,
supra note 151 (defining the fork in the road and the waiver).
153. See Salles, supra note 120; McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 29;
Memorandum from Yimer, et. al., supra note 151.

2016]

ISDS NEGOTIATIONS IN THE TTIP

1377

“cooling-off period” provision.154 This is intended to encourage
disputants to engage in consultation and negotiation, generally for a
period of three to six months, and to give them the opportunity to
amicably and confidentially reach a possible solution on their own.155
Where the same underlying dispute gives rise to claims under
two different investment treaties, each tribunal is faced with a
potential problem of parallel proceedings within the same legal order,
which may give rise to issues under the doctrines of res judicata and
lis pendens.156 The doctrine of res judicata applies to the decisions of
international arbitral tribunals as a general principle of law, common
to most nations.157 In applying the doctrine to another arbitral award,
the tribunal must consider whether there is sufficient identity of
parties, subject matter, and cause of action in order to arbitrate.158 On
the other hand, the concept of lis pendens—the existence of
proceedings before another international tribunal over a dispute
related to a substantially same matter—entitles the tribunal to stay its
proceedings as an exercise of its discretion.159
B. European Union and United States Approaches during the
Negotiations of the TTIP
This Part will focus on the United States and the European
Union as Contracting Parties to the TTIP. Part B.1 describes the EU
background, competence, available drafts released to the public, and
the main provisions of the proposed agreement. Part B.2 considers
the United States Model BIT, the principal source establishing the
United States’ point of view. Part B.3 outlines the twelve issues

154. See Joel Dahlquist, Emergency Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Disputes,
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Mar. 10, 2015), http:// kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/03/10/
emergency-arbitrators-in-investment-treaty-disputes/; see also Memorandum from Yimer, et.
al., supra note 151, at 12 (introducing the cooling off period).
155. See supra note 154.
156. See Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga and Harout Jack Samra, A Defense of Dissents in
Investment Arbitration, 43 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 445 (2012); McLalchlan, Shore &
Weiniger, supra note 14, at 130 (addressing the problems of res judicata and lis pendens).
157. See Fraga & Samra supra note 156; McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14,
at 130 (clarifying the concept of res judicata).
158. See id. (discussing the problem of res iudicata in investment arbitration).
159. See McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 121; Elisa D’Alterio, From
judicial comity to legal comity: A judicial solution to global disorder?, 9 INT’L J.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 394, 404 (2011) (considering the concept of lis pendens and how it
works in investment arbitration).
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discussed during the European Union’s consultation, from both
European Union and United States perspectives.
1. European Union Background
With Article 207 of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union has
acquired the right to regulate foreign direct investment.160
Consequently, the European Union can exercise the exclusive
authority provided by the Lisbon Treaty and reform the regime of the
existing treaties signed by its Member States.161 In June 2012 a first
draft text for a European Union-wide regulation establishing a
framework for the management of financial responsibility for
investor-state dispute settlement tribunals (“the European Union
Draft”) was released.162 The European Commission’s Trade Policy
Committee released initial negotiating objectives for the TTIP
(“European Union Directive”) in June 2013 in a private
correspondence with Member States.163
The ISDS clause found in the TTIP initiated debate in the
European Union Commission and, as a result, the Commission
organized a public consultation on twelve issues between March 27
and July 13, 2014.164 The consultation outlined a possible unified EU
approach in order to achieve a balance between the protection of
investors and the European Union’s and Member States’ right to
regulate.165 Obviously, all the documents related to TTIP (according
to the European Court of Justice) will be subject to European Union
transparency procedures.166
160. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 207, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]; Commission Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Framework for
Managing Financial Responsibility Linked to Investor-State Dispute Settlement Tribunals
Established by International Agreements to which the European Union is Party, at 3, COM
(2012) 335 final (May 6, 2012) [hereinafter European Union Draft].
161. See TFEU art. 207; European Union Draft, see supra note 160, at 3.
162. See generally European Union Draft, supra note 160.
163. See generally Initial Position Paper of the Trade Policy Committee on
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), COM (2013) 238/13 (June 20, 2013),
http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/tpc-ttip-non-papers-for-1st-round-negotiatons-june202013.pdf.
164. See European Commission Press Release IP/14/292, European Commission
launches public online consultation on investor protection in TTIP (Mar. 27, 2014)
(emphasizing the role of public opinion in EU rulemaking) [hereinafter EU Press Release].
165. See id. (stating the value of the public consultation).
166. See Case C-350/12 P, Council v. Int’l Veld, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2039
(Jul 3, 2014), ¶ 89 (clarifying the role of transparency in EU).
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In November 2015, the European Commission completed its
new approach to investment protection and investment dispute
resolution for the TTIP, proposing the creation of an Investment
Court System.167 The Investment Court System would replace all the
ISDS mechanisms in European Union agreements, aiming to create a
permanent mechanism in investment dispute solution if the other
party of the European Union agreement will accept it.168
2. United States Background
While the European Union has publicly stated its desire to
release an official public text of the European Union position on the
ISDS provision in the TTIP, the United States does not want to
publicly release any information regarding these closed-door
negotiations.169 To understand the United States approach, it is
necessary to refer to the Model United States BIT adopted in 2004
and revised by the Obama administration in 2012.170 Like its
predecessor (the 2004 Model BIT), the 2012 Model BIT provides
strong investor protections and preserves the government’s ability to
regulate in favor of the public interest.171 The Obama administration
made several important changes to the text of the Model BIT to
enhance transparency and public participation, sharpen the disciplines

167. See EU finalises proposal for investment protection and Court System for TTIP,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Nov. 12, 2015), http:// trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/
index.cfm?id=1396 [hereinafter EU finalises proposal]; European Union Proposal for
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Trade In Services, Investment And ECommerce, Chapter II (Nov. 12, 2015) [hereinafter European Union Proposal on the
Investment Permanent Court] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/ november/tradoc_
153955.pdf (introducing the investment permanent court).
168. See supra note 167.
169. See Weaver, supra note 7, at 258–59; James Crisp, US to open TTIP reading rooms
across EU, EURACTIV (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-society/usopen-ttip-reading-rooms-across-eu-314175 (providing a detailed account of the reading rooms
set-up in U.S. embassies to provide information to the EU citizens).
170. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104; see generally European Union Proposal on
the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167 (introducing the main source in order to
identify the United States view on investor-state arbitration).
171. See generally Press Release, Off. U.S. Trade Representative and U.S. Dep’t St.,
United States Concludes Review of Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, (Apr. 2012),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2012/april/united-statesconcludes-review-model-bilateral-inves.
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that address preferential treatment to state-owned enterprises, and
strengthen protections relating to labor and the environment.172
3. The United States and European Union on the Twelve Issues
The twelve main questions that have been subject to public
consultation in Europe regard the main classical provisions in a BIT.
These issues are a starting point for comparison between United
States and European Union perspectives on the TTIP. This Part will
analyze differences and similarities between these perspectives and
consider the United States Model BIT, the European Union drafts,
and other relevant public documents.
a. Scope of the Substantive Investment Protection Provisions
Both the United States and the European Union have a very
broad definition of investment modeled in accordance with the Salini
case, discussed above.173 In Salini, this definition included
contributions to the economic development of the host State,
monetary contributions, a certain duration of performance for a
contract, and participation in the risks of the transaction.174 The
United States Model BIT and European Union Proposal on the
Investment Permanent Court also provide similar lists of examples of
investment, which include enterprise, shares, stocks and other forms
of equity participation in an enterprise, bonds, debentures and other
debt instruments of an enterprise, loans to an enterprise, and others.175
b. Non-Discriminatory Treatment for Investors
Both the European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent
Court and United States Model BIT stipulate that foreign investors

172. See id. (stating the differences between the U.S. Model BIT of 2004 and the U.S.
Model BIT of 2012).
173. See Salini, supra note 76.
174. See id. at 622 (“The doctrine generally considers that investment infers:
contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract and a participation in the risks
of the transaction. In reading the Convention's preamble, one may add the contribution to the
economic development of the host State of the investment as an additional condition.” [citation
omitted]).
175. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 1; European Union Proposal on the
Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167 (defining “investment” in the preamble to its
chapter II).
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should not be discriminated against.176 At the same time, the
aforementioned materials recognize that in certain rare cases,
discrimination against investors may need to be envisaged.177 While
the United States Model BIT is silent, the European Union includes
exceptions for differences in treatment between investors and
investments where necessary to achieve public policy objectives (the
protection of health, the environment, consumers, etc.).178
c. Fair and Equitable Treatment
Concerning the fair and equitable treatment standard, the main
objective of the European Union proposal is to clarify the standard in
a way that a State may be held responsible only for breaches of a
limited set of basic rights.179 These include the denial of justice; the
disregard of the fundamental principles of due process; manifest
arbitrariness; targeted discrimination based on gender, race, or
religious belief; and abusive treatment, such as coercion, duress or
harassment.180 In contrast, the United States Model BIT describes this
provision only referring to the concept of the denial of justices and
due process.181
d. Expropriation
On the topic of expropriation, the United States and European
Union approaches are very similar, as they refer to the typical
definition of expropriation.182 One difference between the two
documents is that the European Union draft is more detailed on public

176. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 3, annex B (considering the nondiscrimination clause).
177. See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167,
art. 2; U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, annex B (analyzing the exception to the nondiscrimination clause).
178. See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167,
art. 2; U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, annex B (explaining the specificity of the European
Union provision).
179. See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167,
art. 3 (addressing the objective of European Union regarding the fair and equitable treatment).
180. See id. (mentioning the main rights linked to the fair and equitable treatment).
181. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 5 (considering the United States point of
view in the fair and equitable treatment).
182. See id. art. 6; European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra
note 167, art. 5 (considering in general the position of the Contracting Parties on the
expropriation clause).
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welfare objectives.183 The United States considers public welfare
objectives to include public health, safety, and the environment.184
Meanwhile, the European Union considers non-discriminatory
measures taken for legitimate public purposes to include the
protection of public health, safety, environment or public morals;
social or consumer protection; or promotion and protection of cultural
diversity.185
e. Ensuring the Right to Regulate and Investment Protection
Article 2 of the European Union Proposal on the Investment
Permanent Court contains specific language describing permissible
regulatory measures.186 The objective is to achieve a balance between
the protection of investors and the Member States’ right to regulate.187
The European Union plans to safeguard the Member States’ right to
regulate as a basic underlying principle so that investment protection
standards cannot be interpreted by arbitral tribunals in a manner that
would detrimentally affect the right to regulate. Meanwhile, the
European Union would ensure that all the necessary safeguards and
exceptions are in place.188 There is no specific United States provision
on this issue.189
f. Transparency in ISDS
Both the United States Model and the European Union Proposal
on the Investment Permanent Court aim to ensure transparency and
openness in the ISDS system under the TTIP, making hearings open
and all documents available to the public.190 The European
Commission also proposed to include the 2013 UNCITRAL Rules on
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State-Arbitration as
183. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, annex 1 (explaining how the European Union
provision is more detailed).
184. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, annex B (discussing the United States
provision on expropriation).
185. See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167,
Annex 1 (considering the European Union provision on expropriation).
186. See id. art. 2 (introducing the concept of regulatory measure).
187. See EU Press Release, supra note 164 (discussing the aim of the EU).
188. See id. (analyzing the objective of the EU).
189. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104 (underlying that there is not a provision on the
right to regulate in the U.S. Model BIT).
190. See EU Press Release, supra note 164, at 19; U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art.
29 (describing the purpose of the European Union and U.S.).
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mandatory within the TTIP.191 These rules would “contribute
significantly to the establishment of a harmonized legal framework
for a fair and efficient settlement of international investment disputes,
increase transparency and accountability and promote good
governance.”192
g. Multiple Claims and Relationship to Domestic Courts
Both the United States and the European Union address the
problem of multiple claims since investors are able to either seek to
obtain redress in domestic courts or to submit a claim to the relevant
Investment Tribunal.193 They also require a cooling-off period, where
before seeking arbitration the parties must engage in consultation or
mediation.194 Nevertheless, no mandatory exhaustion of local
remedies is required.195
h. Arbitrator Ethics, Conduct and Qualifications
The US Model BIT suggests that an arbitration tribunal be
comprised of three arbitrators: one appointed by each party and the
third appointed by agreement of the disputing parties.196 In contrast,
the European Union proposes a Permanent Investment Court system,
an innovative composition involving a tribunal of first instance,
composed by fifteen judges — five nationals of a Member State of the
European Union, five nationals of the United States, and five
nationals of third countries.197 The EU text also affirms that it is
desirable that the arbitrator will have expertise in international
191. See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167,
art. 18 (analyzing the European Union proposal).
192. See Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State-Arbitration, UNCITRAL
(2014), prmbl (clarifying the object of the rule).
193. See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167,
at 14; U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 23 (introducing the multiple claim issue).
194. See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167,
arts. 2-5; U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 23 (addressing the cooling-off period clause).
195. See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167;
U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 24 (discussing the absence of the exhaustion of local
remedies provision).
196. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 27 (describing how the tribunal should be
composed according to the U.S. Model BIT).
197. See Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Trade in Services, Investment
and E-Commerce, art. 9 (Nov. 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ doclib/ docs/ 2015/ september/
tradoc_153807.pdf (introducing the tribunal of first instance and analyzing the European
Union proposal).
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investment law, international trade law, and the resolution of disputes
arising under international investment or international trade
agreements.198 The European Union also aims to realize a roster of
qualified experts to ensure that both the European Union and the
United States have agreed to and vetted the arbitrators, ensuring their
abilities and independence.199
i. Reducing the Risk of Frivolous and Unfounded Cases
The European Union proposes the introduction of instruments to
easily dismiss frivolous claims.200 For instance, the European Union is
proposing that the losing party to any arbitration case should bear all
reasonable costs of the proceedings if a disputing party has acted
improperly by raising manifestly frivolous objections, improper
preliminary objections, or unfounded claims.201 The US Model BIT
only refers to the possibility that the tribunal considers the claimant’s
claim or the respondent’s objection in order to verify whether or not it
is frivolous.202
j. Allowing Claims To Proceed (Filter)
The European Union intends to introduce a specific mechanism
called a filter.203 A filter grants a party to the agreement the possibility
to intervene and dismiss claims in particular cases that involve
measures taken for prudential reasons, in order to protect the overall
stability and integrity of the financial system.204 The protection of the
financial system is also considered in the US Model BIT, establishing
a sovereign right to regulate for the United States in certain areas.205

198. See id., art. 9.4 (considering the requirements for an arbitrator according to the
European Union proposal).
199. See id. (explaining the selection process in the European Union proposal).
200. See EU Press Release, supra note 164 (stating the European Union proposal on
frivolous claim).
201. See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167,
art. 28.2 (explaining the European Union proposal).
202. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 28 (describing the United States
provision).
203. See EU Press Release, supra note 164 (introducing the European Union proposal
on claims).
204. See id. (discussing the European Union proposal).
205. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104 (noting the lack of any filter in the US model
Bit on the same topic).
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k. Guidance by the Parties on the Interpretation of the Agreement
The United States and the European Union have an identical
approach on interpretation.206 They agree on the binding interpretation
that ISDS Tribunals must respect to limit undesirable interpretations
by ISDS Tribunals.207 Moreover, the parties agree to establish that the
non-disputing party may invite written or oral submissions on issues
relating to the interpretation of the Agreement.208
l. Appellate Mechanism and Consistency of Rulings
One of the main criticisms in international investment arbitration
is the lack of an appellate mechanism.209 The European Union aims to
establish a bilateral appellate mechanism in the TTIP, in order to
allow review of the investor state arbitration awards investor state
dispute solution rulings.210 The proposed appellate body would exist
as a permanent Appeal Tribunal composed of six Members: of whom
two shall be nationals of a Member State of the European Union, two
of the United States, and two of third countries.211 The Appeal
Tribunal Members would be appointed for a six-year term, renewable
once.212 It is implicitly required that the Members of the Appeal
Tribunal shall possess the qualifications required in their respective
countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or be jurists
of recognized competence.213
The introduction of this body would help ensure consistency in
the interpretation of the TTIP and would provide both the government
and the investor with the opportunity to appeal against awards and to
correct arbitrator errors.214 The European Union proposes that the
206. See id. art. 30.3; European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court
supra note 167, art. 13 (analyzing similarities between United States and European Union).
207. See id. (describing the approach of United States and European Union on
interpretation).
208. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 28; European Union Proposal on the
Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167, art. 22.3 (observing that the parties can submit
questions related to the interpretation of the Agreement).
209. See generally Concept Paper, Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path for reform
(May 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF(analyzing a
criticism in investor-state arbitration).
210. See EU Press Release, supra note 164 (addressing the objective of the EU).
211. See id. (debating the European Union proposal).
212. See id. (specifying the tribunal term).
213. See id. (describing the qualities of the panel).
214. See id. (analyzing the benefit of an appellate tribunal); European Comm’n Staff,
Online public consultation on investment protection and investor-to-state dispute settlement
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appellate body will have jurisdiction over the following alleged
errors: interpretation or application of applicable law; appreciation of
the facts, including the appreciation of relevant domestic law; or,
those provided for in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention.215
Although there is no appellate mechanism in the US Model BIT, the
United States has acknowledged the possibility of developing one
under other institutional arrangements, while always guaranteeing
transparency.216
III. ANALYSIS OF THE US AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
APPROACHES TO THE TTIP
This Part analyzes how the negotiation will likely play out
between the United States and the European Union, and whether or
not the differences could prevent the realization of the TTIP. The text
concerning the definition of “investment” will be negotiated between
the two sides without significant difficulty.217 Regarding
discriminatory treatment, while the European Union texts seem to be
more specific, the two proposals are quite similar, indicating that no
significant disagreements should arise.218 Concerning fair and
equitable treatment, the United States provision is not as specific as
the EU Drafts and the other official EU texts.219 The presence of
public pressure in Europe may result in narrowing the United States
general rule.220
During the negotiation procedures, it is likely that an issue may
arise on the TTIP’s expropriation provision.221 In particular, the role
of the regulatory measures is fundamental, and this means that the
parties should negotiate in order to understand which areas must be
(ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (European
Comimission, Working Paper SWD (2015) 3, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2015 /january/tradoc_153044.pdf (analyzing the advantages in creating the appellate
body).
215. See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167,
art. 10 (stating which the competence of the tribunal should be).
216. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 28 (describing the provision related to
the appellate body in the U.S. Model BIT).
217. See generally supra notes 173-75 (discussing the negotiation on the definition of
investment).
218. See generally supra notes 176-78 (debating on non-discrimination treatment).
219. See generally supra notes 179-81 (analyzing the difference on fair and equitable
treatment between the US and EU).
220. See supra note 164 (referring to the problem of public opinion).
221. See generally supra notes 182-85 (discussing expropriation).
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considered legitimate for non-compensation.222 Even though there is
not a specific provision on the right to regulate in the US Model, the
relevant texts of the European Union and United States do not appear
to have any major differences.223 Considering the issue of
transparency, even if both parties agree on most of the provisions,
many criticisms arise, and will continue to arise, on three overlapping
problems that must be considered further: the main characteristics of
arbitration in confidentiality; the right of public knowledge,
considering that citizens will have the burden of the compensation
resulting from citizen’s awards; and the possibility that an appointed
arbitrator’s decision-making will be influenced if the result is
publicized.224
Another problem could be presented by the multiple claim
system.225 On the one hand this is normal, considering that the idea
behind ISDS is to create a “de-politicized” national court and the
delay that arises from a double level of jurisdiction.226 On the other
hand, requiring the exhaustion of local remedies could effectively
favor the domestic courts, avoiding the possibility of parallel
proceedings.227 And even if the contracting parties do not have
substantial differences on the relationship between domestic and
international courts, neither the United States nor European Union
have considered all aspects or potential issues, as stressed by public
opinion in Europe.228
The European Union’s proposal of an Investment Permanent
Court could represent a problem for the negotiation.229 This

222. See generally supra notes 186-89 (addressing the problem of regulatory measure).
223. See id. (considering the position of the contracting parties on regulatory measure).
224. See generally supra notes 190-92 (introducing new criticism on transparency).
225. See generally supra notes 193-95 (introducing a possible problem on multiple
claims).
226. See generally supra notes 196-99 (considering a disadvantage of the exhaustion of
local remedies).
227. See generally supra notes 200-02 (taking into account an advantage of the
exhaustion of local remedies).
228. See supra note 164 (introducing the problem of public opinion on multiple claims).
229. See Stephan Schill, The TTIP Negotiations: US Versus EU Leadership in Global
ARB.
BLOG
(Mar.
5,
2016),
Investment
Governance,
KLUWER
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/03/05/the-ttip-negotiations-us-versus-eu-leadership-inglobal-investment-governance/; Mirjam van de Hel-Koedoot, The Proposed New Investment
Court System for TTIP: The Right Way Forward?, EFILA BLOG (Oct. 14, 2015),
http://efilablog.org/2015/10/14/the-proposed-new-investment-court-system-for-ttip-the-rightway-forward/ (“[T]he U.S. Chamber of Commerce announced on the day of publication of the
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mechanism is not present in the US Model BIT and, since the
publication of European Union document, the United States has still
not officially expressed an opinion.230
Even if the US Model BIT does not contain a specific filter for
frivolous claims, it is plausible for the negotiations to reach a
compromise on this matter.231 The filter mechanism will depend on a
political compromise between the parties. Meanwhile, interpretation
of norms should not create a debate, given the congruence between
US and EU understandings.232 Finally, considering the TTIP’s
appellate system, the question remains whether this body will
resemble a judicial proceeding or an arbitration proceeding.233
CONCLUSION
It is dubious whether the TTIP will come to fruition, but in the
event that it does, it holds the potential to revolutionize the global
economy.234 The United States and the European Union, two huge
modern economies, have the chance to create a completely new
system that it will make trade and investment between them much
simpler.235 However, numerous concerns exist in relation to all the
chapters within the TTIP.236 In particular, within the chapter
pertaining to investment a number of obstacles must first be
overcome.237 As explained earlier, the European Union has proposed
a public consultation on twelve main issues, the resolution of which
deals with most of these concerns.238

Proposal that ‘the proposal is deeply flawed’ and that the US ‘cannot in any way endorse
today’s European Union proposal as a model.”).
230. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (considering the US position).
231. See generally supra notes 203-05 (proposing a solution of the filter mechanism).
232. See generally supra notes 206-09 (stating that the political compromise is the
solution).
233. See generally supra notes 209-16 (addressing few problems that could arise from
the creation of an appellate body).
234. See supra Part I(A); Michael Beckerman, The Future of the Global Economy
Depends on the U.S.-EU Trade Deal, HUFFINGTON POST, (Sept. 11, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-beckerman/the-future-of-the-global-_b_3562595.html
(analyzing the consequences of the TTIP).
235. See supra Introduction (addressing which area the TTIP focus on).
236. See supra note 4 (affirming that the realization of the TTIP represents a difficult
task).
237. See supra notes 18-22 (considering the general issues of the investment chapter).
238. See supra note 164 (taking into account the role of the public opinion).
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The aim of this Comment is neither to provide a political
analysis, nor a social one. Rather, this Comment analyzes the main
issues concerning the TTIP’s investor-state arbitration dispute
solution provisions, looking exclusively at US and EU texts for
guidance. The resulting discovery is that upon dissection, the US and
EU positions on law are not as far apart as they initially seem.
Moreover, they seem reconcilable.239
The United States and European Union have similar points of
view across the scope of the substantive investment protection
provisions, including: non-discriminatory treatment for investors; fair
and equitable treatment; expropriation; multiple claims; the
relationship to domestic courts; reducing the risk of frivolous and
unfounded cases; and guidance by the parties on the interpretation of
the agreement.240 While the United States and European Union agree
on many issues, it remains unclear how the parties might agree on the
following: the proposed Investment Permanent Court; an appellate
mechanism and consistency of rulings mechanisms; transparency in
ISDS ensuring the right to regulate; and investment protection.241
However, with diligence and compromise, these can most likely be
resolved if the parties are willing.242 In conclusion, the fate of the two
of the biggest economies in the world will likely turn on the political
and diplomatic choices made in the course of the TTIP
negotiations.243

239. See supra Part III (affirming that the position between the US and EU are not
different).
240. See supra Part III (clarifying which points the US and EU have in common).
241. See supra Part III (stating on which point the US and EU have a different view).
242. See generally Hans Von Der Burchard, French trade minister: US must move, or
TTIP is dead, POLITICO (Mar. 11, 2016, 3:16 PM), http://www.politico.eu/article/french-trademinister-us-must-move-or-ttip-is-dead/; Owen E. Herrnstadt, Labor Rights, Manufacturing,
and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sep. 3, 2013)
(stating the role of the negotiations).
243. See supra note 242 (claryifing which elements are crucial for the negotiations).
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